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Abstract
The booming Dutch mortgage market and the development of a promising secondary
mortgage market in the Netherlands stress the need for an accurate mortgage
prepayment model that incorporates typical Dutch market and contract
characteristics. One of those typical Dutch features prescribes that each calendar
year the mortgagor is allowed to prepay penalty-free 10 to 20 percent of the original
loan amount. As a consequence, Dutch mortgagees suffer a loss when borrowers
prepay their loans. This risk, once again, underlines the importance of a prepayment
model that focuses on the Dutch market. To derive such model we use historical
data on mortgages originated between January 1989 and June 1999. We estimate
separate models for two popular redemption types: savings mortgages and interest-
only mortgages. In both models we allow for suboptimal prepayment behaviour. The
results clearly indicate that prepayment rates depend on interest rates and the age
of the mortgage contract. Moreover, Dutch prepayment rates peak in the month
December.
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1. Introduction
The booming Dutch mortgage market and the development of a promising
secondary mortgage market in the Netherlands stress the need for an accurate
mortgage prepayment model that incorporates typical Dutch market and contract
characteristics. To manage a mortgage portfolio properly, it is essential to
understand how mortgagors prepay in today's economic environment and how
prepayment will fluctuate as economic conditions change. If interest rates increase
and people prepay then there is no problem; the prepaid principal can be reinvested
at the new, more profitable rate. However, when interest rates increase, prepayment
rates tend to slow down. Hence, lenders who based their funding on prepayment
rates that turn out to be too high, need to attract additional funding against the
prevailing, higher interest rates. Institutions that invest in mortgages, like the Dutch
pension Fund for Public Employees (ABP), do not require additional funding.
However, lower prepayment rates together with higher interest rates will lead to a
market-value loss. Hence both lenders and investors suffer a loss in this situation.
On the other hand, when interest rates decrease, prepayment rates tend to
increase. Prepayments in this economic situation always result in a loss for the
lender or the investor, as the charged penalty is insufficient to cover the
reinvestment costs. The exact size of the loss depends on the difference between the
contract rate and the prevailing mortgage rate and on the part of the remaining
balance that can be prepaid without penalty. In the Netherlands, the mortgagor is
always allowed to prepay penalty-free each calendar year 10 to 20 percent of the
original loan amount. As the remaining balance frequently decreases over time, the
proportion that can be prepaid without penalty is often larger than 10% of the
remaining balance. When a household moves, the mortgagor does not even have to
pay any penalty at all!
From the above discussion it follows that the daily management of a mortgage
portfolio requires a prepayment model that predicts future prepayments accurately.
The prevailing approach to develop such a model is to isolate the determinants on
the basis of historical information on prepayments and to extrapolate the resulting
relationship into the future. Most of this empirical research is based on aggregated
pool-level data. The mortgage pools analysed are mainly based on securutised
American portfolios. For example, Kang and Zenios (1992) used observations of
several hundred thousand Mortgage-Backed Securities over an eight-year period to
estimate their empirical prepayment model. Golub and Pohlman (1994) included
over 28 million historical prepayment rates to calibrate the Wharton prepayment3
model.1 However, the aggregated pool-level data smooths out the individual loan
characteristics that are behind the pool averages. In aggregation, much information
is lost.2 To avoid this problem, we use loan-level data kindly provided by The
Pension Fund for Public Employees in The Netherlands (ABP).  This dataset contains
detailed information on a loan-by-loan level for all mortgages originated by ABP
between January 1989 and June 1999. In total the dataset contains monthly
information on approximately  45,000 interest-only mortgages and 70,000 savings
mortgages. One of the few other studies using loan-level data is Abrahams (1997).
Abrahams draws on historical prepayment data from 206,000 American individual
loans. However, no details are provided on the quantitative model. Another study
using loan-level data is Green and Shoven (1986), who elaborate in more detail on
the proportional hazard model used in their research.
 Our econometric approach builds on Green and Shoven (1986), by applying a
proportional hazard prepayment model to quantify the relationship between
prepayments and factors like the refinance incentive, seasoning, seasonality and
burnout. We carefully define and quantify these factors. In particular we elaborate
on the quantification of the refinance incentive, taking into account typical Dutch
mortgage features. Relevant characteristics are the type of the mortgage,
prepayment penalties and the Dutch tax regime. In this article we focus on two
popular Dutch redemption types: the interest-only mortgage and the savings
mortgage. The latter is a typical Dutch mortgage type that makes full use of the
opportunities offered by the tax authorities in The Netherlands. We illustrate the
quality of the models on the basis of in-sample predictions. Although we use Dutch
data in the analysis, the methodology is generally applicable.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of the literature. Section 3 describes the mortgage market and contracts in the
Netherlands. The prepayment model is described in Section 4. Section 5 describes
the data used to estimate the model and Section 6 contains the results and
illustrates model performance. Section 7 concludes.
                                                                
1 Other, in this context interesting articles that make use of aggregate American mortgage
portfolios include Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Clapp et al. (2000), Collin-Dufresne and
Harding (1999), Hayre (1994), Hayre and Rajan (1995), Hayre et al. (2000), Huang et al.
(1999), Jegadeesh and Ju (2000), Patruno (1994), Richard and Roll (1989), Singh and
McConnell (1996).
2 The difference between using transformations of aggregated data versus using aggregates of
a transformation of the loan-level data can be substantial. A good example is the refinance
incentive. When using pool-level data this is an unknown function of the ratio between the
weighted average coupon rate and a refinance rate (See Jegadeesh and Ju, 2000). If these two
rates are equal to each other then this approach concludes that there is no incentive for the
mortgagors to prepay their loans. However, if the underlying mortgages are analysed on a
loan-by-loan basis then you will find that about half of them have a contract rate that is lower
than the average rate and hence are serious candidates for refinancing.4
2. Modelling prepayment
The main difficulty in managing a mortgage portfolio lies within the prepayment
behaviour of the mortgagor. The literature distinguishes between optimal
prepayment and exogenous prepayment rules. Under optimal prepayments, the
valuation proceeds as for any callable bond by starting at the maturity date of the
contract and working backwards in time. At each point in time, the borrower
prepays when the value of the mortgage, if left uncalled, exceeds the outstanding
debt plus any transaction costs associated with refinancing it. Van Bussel (1998)
applies this approach to Dutch mortgage contracts. The resulting prepayment
behaviour depends only on the term structure of interest rates, thereby ignoring the
individual characteristics of the borrower. These contingent claim techniques with
endogenously determined termination are inappropriate for modelling observed
prepayment numbers. Prepayment data on residential mortgages reveal that the
prepayment option is frequently exercised when the prevailing mortgage rate is
above the contract rate, while the mortgage is often not prepaid when it might be
optimal to do so. Optimal call valuation models cannot explain this behaviour.
Valuation models in which prepayments are exogenously specified override this
empirical shortcoming. Exogenous prepayment models can be divided into two
categories. First, there are models that are based on endogenous models. These
models take an optimal call model as a starting point and add exogenous calls that
are unrelated to the interest rate. On the other hand, there are strictly empirical
models, which do not assume any optimal behaviour. Instead, these models relate
the observed prepayments to a set of explanatory variables.
Dunn and McConnell (1981a,b) acknowledged the non-optimal behaviour and
incorporate it into a model in which prepayments are only interest rate driven with
non-financial termination features. Dunn and McConnell add a Poisson-driven
process to explain the non-optimal prepayments. Even though such exogenous
terminations always increase the market value of the mortgage they are not
necessarily irrational. Such behaviour is often due to personal circumstances, such
as job relocation or change in family size.
The Brennan and Schwartz valuation model (1985) adopts Dunn and
McConnell's approach to include suboptimal prepayment behaviour. Instead of
using a one-factor interest rate model, as Dunn and McConnell do, Brennan and
Schwartz use a two-factor model to value the mortgage and its prepayment option.
They abstract from default, a possibility that is included in the model developed by
Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1992). Alongside optimal termination behaviour
they also use a Poisson process to include suboptimal termination decisions. None
of these models addresses transaction costs - a shortcoming that does not hold for
the models developed by Giliberto and Ling (1992) and Archer and Ling (1993). As5
well as considering prepayments that occur when the option is out-of-the-money,
Archer and Ling (1993) recognize that many mortgagors fail to exercise the
prepayment option when this would be optimal. Their results indicate that
transaction costs account for the observed lags in exercising in-the-money
prepayment options. Stanton (1995) explicitly modelled heterogeneity in prepayment
costs and found that the transaction costs in the observed termination data are
significantly higher than the explicit monetary costs associated with refinancing.
Strictly empirical exogenous models do not use optimality in characterizing
prepayment behaviour. Instead, these models relate the observed prepayments to a
set of explanatory variables. The literature on these models is extensive, see the
references in the introduction. The prepayment decision is analysed by using models
estimated from historical data. In these models, four main determinants are
specified. The first and most important element that determines prepayment is the
refinancing incentive. Homeowners tend to refinance the existing mortgage when the
current mortgage rate is far enough under the contract rate. Secondly, not
everybody will react immediately when faced with a prepayment opportunity. The
most aware mortgagors will react and prepay their mortgage the first time a
refinance incentive occurs. If the same refinance incentive occurs at a later stage, a
smaller number of the remaining mortgagors will respond. The phenomenon of
prepayment rates declining as mortgage pools age through interest cycles is known
as burnout. The burnout effect is an aging effect, the older the pool of mortgages, the
lower the prepayment rates. Thirdly, seasoning is also an aging factor but one with
an opposite effect. When borrowers take out a new mortgage it is generally unlikely
that the interest rate, family or employment circumstances change in the near
future. The prepayment rates are therefore low at the beginning of a mortgage
contract and increase gradually over time until they reach a stable or ''seasoned''
level.3 Finally, seasonality measures the correlation between prepayment rates and
the month of the year. This cyclical behaviour is highly linked with the cyclical
behaviour in house sales. Homeowners’ relocation tends to peak in the spring and
summer and decline in the autumn and winter months.4
Macro-economic factors could be incorporated as well. A factor that is frequently
mentioned is house prices. However, using the resulting prepayment model for
forecasting would also require a model to describe house price fluctuations. This is
not the focus of this paper and we follow the existing literature by including the four
aforementioned factors: refinancing incentives, burnout, seasoning and seasonality.
                                                                
3 The American PSA (Public Securities Association) model is based on this idea. The PSA
model assumes that the prepayment rates increase linearly during the first thirty months of
the contract until they reach a 6% per year level, at which prepayment rates will remain
constant.
4 See for example Richard and Roll (1989).6
Before describing the data and the econometric model, we first give an overview of
the Dutch mortgage market in the next section.
3. The Mortgage Market in the Netherlands
The mortgage market in the Netherlands has become a highly dynamic market.
Indicators are a substantial growth of the market, the increasing interest for the
secondary market and the sharp increase in the variety of loan types. During most
of the eighties the linear and annuity mortgages were the most popular mortgages
types. At each payment date, total payment consists of an interest and a principal
component. The principal component is fixed for a linear mortgage and hence total
monthly payments decrease over time as interest payments decrease. In an annuity
the total monthly payments are fixed. Initially the part related to interest payments
is large whereas the principal payments are small. The reverse holds towards
maturity. In the 1990s the life-insurance mortgages and savings mortgages became
increasingly popular for their tax friendliness. Under such mortgages, no principal is
repaid during the term of the contract. Instead, the borrower makes payments on a
regular basis to the lender. These payments comprise interest on the mortgage loan
and an investment or savings element. Upon maturity, the loan is repaid with the
money saved in the investment or savings account. Since no repayments take place
during the term of these contracts, the outstanding mortgage balance remains
unimpaired. As a consequence, the interest costs to the mortgagor do not decline
over the years. However, in the Netherlands these interest costs are tax deductible
for the entire term of the contract. On the other hand, the return on the savings and
investment accounts are, under certain conditions, not taxed. Hence, these products
take optimal advantage of the tax system in The Netherlands.
The size of the lump sum payment at maturity of such saving-to-repay
mortgages depends on the return of an agreed-upon investment benchmark. For a
life-insurance mortgage, the profitability of the insurance company is used as the
benchmark. In the event of disappointing economic performance these expected
returns may not be realized, and the resulting lump sum payment is too small to
repay the loan. This scenario would leave the mortgagor with a debt at the end of the
term. On the other hand, more favourable economic conditions would leave the
mortgagor with more money than expected, after repayment. This uncertainty is
absent in the savings mortgage. With a savings mortgage, the monthly premium is
determined such that at maturity enough capital is accumulated to pay back the
entire loan. Moreover, the interest compensation on the savings account is equal to
the interest cost of the corresponding loan. Hence, apart from the tax effects, a
savings mortgage is comparable with an annuity mortgage. Whether a lender grants
a fully amortizing annuity-mortgage or a savings mortgage will not substantially7
influence the periodical cash flows received. In the first case it consists of
repayments plus interest while in the second case it is composed of savings
premiums and interest. The remaining debt of a fully amortizing annuity-mortgage
decreases with time. For a savings mortgage, the debt does not change during the
maturity of the contract. However, savings premiums are collected during the life of
such a mortgage contract and since the interest reimbursement on these premiums
equals the mortgage rate, the outstanding balance of a savings mortgage is equal to
the remaining debt of a comparable annuity mortgage at any moment in time.
In the second half of the 1990s, the interest-only and the investment mortgage
became popular. No principal payments nor any periodic savings or investment
premiums are required on an interest-only mortgage. Hence the regular payments
only consist of interest. At the end of the term, principal repayment is achieved
through the sale of the property, by taking out a new mortgage or by individual
savings. Due to the higher credit risk, Dutch mortgagees never grant an interest-
only loan that exceeds 75 percent of the foreclosure value of the underlying
property. This 75 percent level is agreed upon by all Dutch mortgage suppliers and
is set out in the Code of Conduct.5
The introduction of the investment mortgage was encouraged by the high
returns on the Dutch stock market. With this new mortgage type the return on the
investment  account no longer relates to the mortgage rate or to the return of the
insurance company. Instead it solely depends on the investment decisions made by
the homeowner. Statistics Netherlands (1999) shows that in 1998 the market share
of the investment mortgage already exceeded 50% of the newly issued mortgages.
More recently, so-called switch mortgages have become popular. Instead of
choosing beforehand between a savings and an investment mortgage, mortgagors
can switch between building up the principal amount through a savings account or
by an investment account. Similar to a savings or an investment mortgage, the
borrower does not pay back any principal during the term of the contract.
The Code of Conduct that regulates the maximum loan-to-foreclosure value for
interest-only mortgages also prescribes minimum prepayment possibilities offered to
Dutch mortgagors. As result, at least 10 percent of the initial principal can be
prepaid within any full calendar year without penalties. Various lenders offer a
larger percentage, such as 15 or 20 percent. Besides the annual partial penalty-free
prepayment opportunity, situations exist in which complete prepayment is free of
costs: the sale of the house, demise of the mortgagor, bankruptcy and the reception
of a fire-insurance benefit. The only other instance that prepayment is free, is when
                                                                
5 Since October 1 st, 1996, practically all mortgage suppliers subscribe to the non-binding
interbank code of conduct for mortgage lending. This code is drawn up in co-operation with
the government, consumers' associations and advisory bodies, and it prescribes minimum
requirements regarding offer and contract conditions.8
the mortgage rate is reset at the beginning of the next fixed-rate period. Dutch
mortgages usually have a maturity of thirty years with the interest rate fixed for a
period of between five and twenty years. At the end of each fixed-rate period the
mortgage rate is reset to the prevailing market mortgage rate. Usually there are no
caps or floors restricting the interest rate adjustments at the reset date so that the
new contract rate is in conformity with the market rate.
Above the annual permitted prepayment, additional prepayments are settled at
costs equal to the present value of the difference between the future monthly
interest payments of a new contract and the existing mortgage. Sometimes an
additional fixed amount between 250 and 500 guilders is added to this penalty.
These ''yield maintenance'' penalties are in place to discourage prepayments.
Despite these discouraging costs, Dutch mortgagors frequently prepay their
loan. This is illustrated in Table 1, which summarizes the recent developments on
the Dutch mortgage market. As Table 1 shows, the market has grown enormously;
between 1993 and 2000 the outstanding amount even more than doubled. In the
same period, the amount issued per year even tripled. This sharp increase can be
ascribed by the increase in both the average loan size and the number of newly
issued mortgages. As Table 1 illustrates, a substantial part of the newly issued
mortgages consists out of second lien mortgages and mortgages that replace existing
loans. These large replacement numbers illustrate that, despite all costs,
prepayment is an important feature when managing a Dutch mortgage portfolio.
Table 1: Overview Dutch mortgage market
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Amount Outstanding
(Euro billions) 119 133 146 167 193 221 254 279
Amount newly issued
(Euro billions) 21 27 26 38 49 60 78 70
Number of newly issued
mortgages (thousands) 303 384 350 470 537 577 665 510
Of which
Purchase home 65.3% 56.0% 64.0% 55.1% 52.3% 48.5% 49.2% 52.3%
Second mortgages 13.6% 11.4% 11.1% 21.9% 28.1%
Refinancing
34.7% * 44.0%* 36.0%*
31.3% 36.3% 40.4% 28.9% 19.6%
Average mortgage rate 7.5% 7.3% 7.1% 6.3% 5.8% 5.6% 5.1% 5.7%
*The numbers of 1993, 1994, and 1995 do not distinguish between second mortgages and refinancing.
Source: Statistics Netherlands9
4.  A prepayment model for the Dutch market
The empirical prepayment models summarized in Section 2 commonly specify
four main determining factors: refinance incentive, burnout, seasoning and
seasonality. The way in which the four factors are incorporated should reflect the
characteristics of the underlying market. For example, due to the prepayment
penalty included in Dutch contracts, the refinance incentive in the Netherlands
must be defined differently than its American counterpart. In this section we specify
the econometric model, which describes the four factors and incorporates the Dutch
market characteristics.
The econometric model in this paper is based on Green and Shoven (1986) and
Schwartz and Torous (1992) who use proportional hazard models. Differences stem
from ensuring that the probabilities in the model are guaranteed to be between zero
and one. The main element in the model is the so-called hazard rate, which
represents the probability of prepayment for a mortgage in a specific month, given
that it has not been prepaid at an earlier stage. Let  it h  denote the hazard rate for
mortgage i in month t:
)
~
; ( * ) , ; ( 2 1 0 J p J J it t it x age h h =
where  ) , ; ( 2 1 0 J J t age h  is the baseline hazard depending on the age of the mortgage
(in months) in month t and the parameters  2 1,J J . The first parameter indicates the
baseline-hazard for a mortgage that has just been originated, whereas the second
parameter indicates how the baseline-hazard changes with an increase in the age of
the mortgage. The function  )
~
; ( J p it x  is the proportionality factor that depends on
explanatory variables  it x  and the parameters J
~
. Given the explanatory variables,
which will be defined later on, the parameters  J
~
 indicate the effect on the
proportional hazard by a change in the related explanatory variable.
The baseline hazard contains the seasoning effect, which refers to the gradual
increase in prepayment speeds until a reasonably steady-state speed is reached
(Hayre, Chaudhary and Young, 2000). The traditional approach to modelling the
seasoning process is to assume that the seasoning curve reflects an  S-shaped
relation between the prepayment rate and the mortgage age. When the mortgage is
recently originated, it is highly unlikely that it will be prepaid in the near future.
Similarly, the likelihood that the family or employment circumstances change within
a short time span is rather small. Moreover, changing homes is a major undertaking
with high transaction costs and most home purchases are therefore followed by a
settling-in period. Consequently, prepayments associated with newly originated10
mortgages are initially quite small, and increase gradually during the so-called
ramp-up period. After this ramp-up period, the housing turnover likelihood will
stabilize at its natural or ”seasoned” level.  It could be argued that loans which are
used to refinance already existing mortgages season faster than loans taken out to
finance the purchase of a house because many of the elements that determine
seasoning (e.g. a new born-baby, increased income, divorce) are already developed to
some extent in a refinanced loan. However, as pointed out by Hayre et. al. (2000),
this view is not universally held. Homeowners who plan to move in the near future
are most likely not interested in starting the procedure of applying for a new
mortgage and paying the corresponding transaction costs. These transaction costs
can be very high, especially in the Netherlands where the homeowner must pay a
yield maintenance penalty. This penalty is not in place when the mortgagor moves.
Hence, a homeowner who has plans to move in the near future will probably not
refinance his mortgage until after the move. The refinancing of a mortgage can thus
be read as a signal that the mortgagor does not intend to move in the near future.
Therefore the S-shaped seasoning curve should hold for both purchase loans and
refinancing loans and as such the following specification serves as the baseline
hazard:
)) exp( 1 /( 1 ) , ; ( 2 1 2 1 0 t t age age h J J J J - - + =
The specification is chosen in such a way that a positive parameter value
indicates that the hazard rate increases with the age of the mortgage until the
seasoned level is reached.
The proportionality factor contains the other relevant factors in determining
prepayments. Before elaborating on these factors the specification of the
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Again, the parameters indicate the direction of the effect of an increase in an
explanatory variable. The functional forms for  ) , ; ( 2 1 0 J J t age h and  )
~
; ( J p it x
guarantee that the hazard rate  it h  is in between zero and one. The hazard rate is
also known as the Single Month Mortality rate (= SMM), which, in turn, relates to the
well-known Conditional Prepayment Rate ( CPR) as  CPR = 1- (1-SMM)12.  Once the
hazard rate and its components are defined, we can estimate the parameters by
maximizing the log-likelihood. For a sample of N mortgages starting in month t i and



































where yit  is 1 if mortgage i is prepaid in month t and zero otherwise. Consequently,
the first term of the equation only differs from zero if mortgage i is prepaid in month
t. The second term contributes to the log-likelihood in all months. Hence, if no
prepayment occurs, the chosen specification forces the parameters to be chosen
such that the Single Month Mortality is as close to zero as possible. On the other
hand, when a mortgage is prepaid, the log-likelihood is equal to log(hit). And as a
result of maximizing the log-likelihood, this corresponds with a value of hit that is as
close to one as possible.
Before being able to estimate the parameters, the variables that are included in
it x  must be specified. It should come as no surprise that these variables are chosen
to describe the pillars on which most prepayment models are built: refinance
incentives, seasonality and burn-out. The seasoning factor is already included in the
baseline hazard.
In determining the refinance incentive, we assume that a homeowner who
considers replacing the mortgage with a new loan has to borrow an amount equal to
principal outstanding on the existing mortgage plus the after-tax prepayment
penalty. As the marginal tax rate is not observed we have to determine it. Details
can be found in Appendix A. Computation of the before-tax prepayment penalty
involves several steps. First, a yield maintenance penalty is computed as the present
value of the difference between the future interest payments of a new mortgage and
the existing contract. Administration costs are added to this yield maintenance
penalty in order to yield the before-tax prepayment penalty. Together with the
marginal tax rate this yields the after-tax prepayment penalty. For refinancing to be
attractive, the effect of a lower mortgage rate has to outweigh the consequences of a
higher debt level. To determine this we calculate the present value of the future
monthly payments when the mortgage is left uncalled and compare this with the
present value of a newly taken out mortgage.6 The refinance incentive is positive
when the present value of the mortgage, if left uncalled, exceeds the present value
when refinanced. In all other situations the refinance incentive equals zero. Details
on the computation of the refinance incentive for different mortgage redemption
types can be found in Appendix B. For several redemption types, and a special case
of the quantification of the refinance incentive, Charlier (2001) presents graphical
representations of it.
The above defined refinance incentive incorporates the after-tax penalty Dutch
borrowers must pay when refinancing their mortgagor. This penalty, however, is not
in place when the mortgagor moves. The value of this ‘moving option’ increases with
                                                                
6 Note that mortgagors can choose a fixed-interest rate period that differs from the remaining
fixed-interest rate period on the current mortgage. However, this leads to the question
regarding the choice of period. This requires a separate investigation from which we abstract
for the moment.12
decreasing interest rates. The tendency to move house when interest rates are low is
strengthened by the fact that the mortgagor’s income can service a larger debt,
which enables him to buy a bigger house.
In the absence of refinancing incentives, home sales are the main driver for
prepayments.7 In the Netherlands, these home sales are primary a consequence of
the desire to “move up” to a larger or more expensive house. Relocation is of much
less importance in this small country. Accepting a new job, for example, generally
implies that the individual simply changes his commuting route rather than his
residence. People in their mid-thirties and forties are considered the most likely
candidates for upgrading. To capture this we include the age of the corresponding
mortgagor as well as the square of his age in the proportionality factor. 8 Moreover,
we included a dummy variable to capture the higher likelihood that an apartment-
owner considers upgrading, as opposed to the owner of a single family home.
The seasonality factor is accounted for by including a constant term and
dummies for each month of the year. This is related to the fact that relocation tends
to peak in the spring and summer months and declines in the autumn and winter
months. For identification of the parameters we have to normalize one of the
seasonality coefficients at zero. In this paper we set the coefficient related to the
month of August to zero because the average prepayment rate in August is roughly
equal to the annual average. This implies that all other seasonality dummies must
be interpreted relative to August.
The next variable included in our model captures the burnout effect. Burnout is
a consequence of changes in the composition of the mortgage pool as the mortgagors
who are willing and able to refinance leave the pool at faster rates than other
mortgagors.9 As a result, the proportion of ‘slow prepaying mortgagors’ becomes
larger over time. As such, part of the burnout effect is already absorbed in our
model through our definition of the other variables,  e.g. apartment owners are
expected to prepay faster than single-family homeowners. However, this is already
absorbed by the dummy variable for the underlying property. Consequently, the
probability that the mortgage of an apartment-owner is still in the pool at month t is
smaller than that of a mortgage of a single-family homeowner. Hence, rather than
explicitly modelling the changing composition of the pool, we opted for a burnout
variable which indicates an increasing or decreasing likelihood of individual
mortgage refinancing in a particular month. In this paper, the burnout variable is
defined as the refinance incentive in the current month minus the maximum
                                                                
7 Dutch homeowners can rollover their mortgage loan when moving to a new house.
Consequently, the lock-in effect, which refers to the damping effect on the likelihood of
moving for those who have loan rates below current mortgage rates, is not relevant in the
Netherlands.
8 For scaling purposes we use the age in years divided by 10 and its square.
9 See Hayre (1994).13
refinance incentive in the past. A negative value shows that the mortgagor did not
take advantage of an earlier, more profitable opportunity. Based on this knowledge,
the prepayment expectation for such a mortgagor should be adjusted downwards.
Hence, we expect to observe a positive parameter corresponding with this burnout
variable.
Another variable included in our analysis is the number of subsidized parts.
Some mortgagors receive part of their mortgage subsidized by the government. If the
mortgage is prepaid the subsidy might be lost. Therefore subsidized parts could lead
to lower prepayment rates. In addition, if the mortgage consists of several (non-
subsidized) parts then prepayment of a single part might be affected by the presence
of the other parts. Therefore we include the number of other parts as well. Finally,
we include time dummies to account for the media effect. These dummies would
also pick-up increasing relocations, if present.
5. Data
The data, required to estimate the parameters in the prepayment model, are
kindly provided by ABP. The dataset contains information on a loan-by loan level of
all mortgages originated between January 1989 and June 1999. This number
exceeds 100,000 mortgages. As a consequence, the dataset is too large to use all
individual mortgages in the log-likelihood specification of our model. Rather than
using all mortgages, a randomly selected subsample of approximately 4,000
mortgages is utilized. By selecting this subsample it is required that its
characteristics correspond with the main characteristics of the full sample. For
example, the fraction of mortgages originated in each year should match, and for
each origination year, the fraction of mortgages that is prepaid in the subsample
should match the fraction in the full sample. Tables 2 and 3 show how well the
subsamples of 1,940 savings mortgages and 2,037 interest-only mortgages match
the characteristics of the complete dataset. The reported numbers add up to 100%
for both the full sample and the subsample. The interpretation is the following: of
the total amount of savings-mortgages originated as of 1989, 5.48 percent (full
sample) was originated in 1992 and has not prepaid whereas 7.02 percent was also
originated in 1992 but already has prepaid. Hence 12.50 percent of the originated
amount as of 1989 was originated in 1992. Of this 12.50 percent, 44 percent has
not prepaid whereas 56 has.
When constructing the data, four savings mortgages were dropped due to
incomplete information on the history of the related mortgage rates. For the same
reason, 31 interest-only mortgages were left out. Definitions and summary statistics
on the variables used in the application are presented in Table 4.14
Table 2: comparison of subsample with full sample for savings mortgages
Full sample Subsample Full sample Subsample
Origination Year Not Prepaid Not Prepaid Prepaid Prepaid
1989 0.82% 0.84% 0.87% 1.04%
1990 2.39% 2.22% 3.36% 3.29%
1991 3.72% 3.92% 5.40% 5.33%
1992 5.48% 5.21% 7.02% 6.70%
1993 7.11% 7.07% 7.06% 6.51%
1994 7.75% 7.74% 6.05% 6.96%
1995 7.24% 7.24% 4.03% 4.52%
1996 8.80% 8.40% 3.11% 3.33%
1997 7.82% 7.75% 1.56% 1.76%
1998 6.83% 6.62% 0.45% 0.36%
1999 3.11% 3.21% 0.02% 0.00%
Table 3: comparison of subsample with full sample for interest-only mortgages
Full sample Subsample Full sample Subsample
Origination Year Not Prepaid Not Prepaid Prepaid Prepaid
1989 1.21% 1.47% 0.13% 0.24%
1990 0.24% 0.20% 0.05% 0.00%
1991 0.32% 0.07% 0.18% 0.21%
1992 1.47% 1.28% 0.88% 0.83%
1993 2.35% 2.85% 1.50% 1.35%
1994 3.72% 3.68% 2.07% 2.55%
1995 4.75% 4.38% 2.05% 1.88%
1996 9.46% 9.49% 3.21% 3.40%
1997 12.54% 13.09% 3.13% 3.40%
1998 26.59% 25.60% 2.39% 2.23%
1999 21.52% 21.36% 0.27% 0.46%
Figures 1 through 8 indicate the unilateral relationship between the factors
and the CPR. These figures are based on those values or buckets for the explanatory
variables for which at least 500 observations are available. Figures 1 through 4
relate to the relationships for savings mortgages, Figures 5 through 8 relate to
interest-only mortgages. Figure 1 illustrates a clearly positive relationship between
the CPR and the age (seasoning) of a savings mortgage. This positive relation is, less
obvious when looking at an interest-only mortgage (Figure 5). Figures 2 and 6 show
the seasonal pattern. It holds for both savings mortgages and interest-only
mortgages that the prepayment rates are relatively high in April, the summer
months and December. The main difference between both redemption types is that
the summer-peak occurs in July for savings mortgages while the prepayment on
interest-only mortgages seems to peak in June. The December effect we observe for
both redemption types might be caused by tax effects: if a mortgage is prepaid, the15
Burnout Burnout, see main text 96,609 –0.48 51,713 –0.39
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Table 4: Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics
Savings mortgages Interest-only mortgages
Variable Definition # obs Mean # obs Mean
Age Age of the mortgage in
months











related costs are tax deductible, which might be an incentive to prepay the loan in
the last month of the fiscal year (which coincides with the calendar year).10 Figures 3
and 7 show the positive relationship between the prepayment rate and the refinance
incentive. This relation seems to be stronger for savings mortgages than for interest-
only mortgages.
Finally, the relationship between the age of the mortgagor (divided by 10) and
the CPR is plotted in Figures 4 and 8. As these figures illustrate, this relation is
humped-shaped; the prepayment rate is relatively low during the early adult-years
of the mortgagor, increases during his thirties and forties and decreases again
afterwards. This corresponds with our hypothesis regarding upgrading. The humped
shape relation is much more obvious for savings mortgages than it is for interest-
only mortgages. Due to differences like this we opted for estimating separate models
for savings mortgages and interest-only models. The estimation results are
presented in the next section.
6.  Results
This section presents the results of the prepayment model developed for the
Dutch Market. Recall that in this paper we estimate a separate prepayment model
for both the savings mortgage and interest-only mortgage. Moreover, for both of
these redemption types we specified two models, either excluding or including
burnout. The empirical outcomes of the resulting four prepayment functions are
presented in Table 5.
The first column in Table 5 contains the explanatory variables and indicates
whether a variable belongs to the  baseline hazard function or to the proportionality
factor. The next two columns contain the parameter estimates, and the
corresponding standard errors (in parentheses), for the savings mortgages. Column
two excludes burnout, whereas column three includes it. Time dummies are only
included for 1992 through 1999 because the observations in earlier origination-
years are insufficient to identify separate year dummies for 1990 and 1991.
                                                                
10 One might expect that this peak in December is caused by mortgagors who exercise the
option to prepay 10 to 20% within a calendar year without paying a penalty. However, the
plots are solely based on mortgages that are completely prepaid. Hence, curtailments cannot
cause this December peak.17
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Figures for interest-only mortgages

























































Table 5: Estimation results (standard errors in parentheses)a
Savings mortgage Savings mortgage Interest only Interest only
Variable Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
BaselineAge 0.132** (0.021) 0.121** (0.015) 0.125 (0.063) 0.124** (0.036)
Prop Refinance 0.021* (0.011) –0.011 (0.012) 0.018* (0.009) –0.001 (0.009)
Factor Burnout 0.106** (0.018) 0.095** (0.024)
Djan –0.071 (0.043) –0.090 * (0.045) 0.016 (0.067) 0.001 (0.070)
Dfeb –0.097* (0.044) –0.107* (0.045) –0.020 (0.066) –0.030 (0.069)
Ddec 0.128** (0.040) 0.133** (0.041) 0.213** (0.061) 0.220** (0.064)
Dflat 0.097** (0.032) 0.093** (0.033) –0.019 (0.051) –0.019 (0.054)
Notherparts 0.009 (0.016) 0.005 (0.016) –0.016 (0.020) –0.018 (0.021)
Nsubsidy –0.061 (0.033) –0.042 (0.034)
Agemortgagor2 –0.005 (0.017) –0.008 (0.017) 0.006 (0.007) 0.005 (0.007)
Agemortgagor –0.027 (0.126) –0.004 (0.132) –0.074 * (0.067) –0.061 (0.070)
Dyear92 0.022 (0.141) 0.026 (0.147)
Dyear93 0.122 (0.125) 0.139 (0.131)
Dyear94 0.264* (0.122) 0.341** (0.128)
Dyear95 0.254* (0.121) 0.322* (0.126) 0.190* (0.077) 0.207** (0.080)
Dyear96 0.345** (0.120) 0.410** (0.126) 0.231** (0.071) 0.254** (0.074)
Dyear97 0.420** (0.120) 0.502** (0.125) 0.324** (0.067) 0.360** (0.069)
Dyear98 0.472** (0.119) 0.572** (0.125) 0.353** (0.065) 0.376** (0.067)
Dyear99 0.509** (0.121) 0.607** (0.127) 0.424** (0.065) 0.446** (0.067)
Log–Lik –4400.53 –4370.03 –2212.98 –2198.99
** means significant at the 1% level; * means significant at the 5% level
a All models contain a constant term in both the Basline hazard and the proportionality
factor. The proportionality factor contains dummies for each month where August is the
reference month. We only report the results for the significant month dummies.
Columns four and five refer to the prepayment functions for interest-only
mortgages. The difference again consists of either excluding or including burnout.
For interest-only mortgages we could only identify year dummies as of 1995.
As illustrated in Table 5, the parameters belonging to most year dummies are
significant at the 5% level and also formal chi-square tests illustrate that the
models, which incorporate the year dummies, are preferred to models without them.
This is attributed to the media effect, meaning that intermediaries urge people more
to prepay their mortgages.
Due to the chosen specification, the baseline hazard has an S-shaped curve. For
the four models, the baseline hazard is equal to 0.99 after 53, 60, 40 and 46
months, respectively. This implies that a pool of Dutch mortgages seasons rather
quickly; within 4 to 5 years the seasoned level is reached.
When considering the results for the models without an explicit burnout variable
(columns two and four of Table 5), the effect of the refinance incentive is significantly20
positive. This implies that Dutch borrowers are sensitive to interest fluctuations and
that they do prepay their mortgages when financially attractive opportunities
appears.
However, this relationship between prepayment speeds and the prevailing
refinance incentives becomes insignificant when we take the burnout variable into
consideration. This is illustrated in the third and fifth column of Table 5. These
columns present the results for the savings mortgage and interest-only mortgage,
respectively, including a separate burnout variable. Recall that burnout is defined as
the prevailing refinance incentive minus the maximum refinance incentive in the
past. The corresponding positive coefficient, which is significant at a 1% level,
indicates that past refinance incentives play an important role in explaining current
prepayment rates. For example, mortgagors who have not had the opportunity to
refinance their loan at attractive rates in the past are more likely to prepay when
this opportunity appears in the future. On the other hand, individuals who did not
act in the past when attractive refinance rates appeared, tend to respond equally
passively when similar opportunities come along.
For savings mortgages, the parameters related to the month dummies
(seasonality) are individually insignificant, except for the months January, February
and December. In January and February prepayments are lower than those in
August (the reference month) whereas they are higher in December. For the other
months, the SMM does not differ from the SMM for August. Interest-only mortgages
prepay more in the month December. The January and February effects are not
present. In all models, the coefficient related to December is the largest positive.
This implies that prepayments  are largest in December.
When considering upgrading (represented by Dflat, Agemortgagor and
Agemortgagor2) we conclude that for savings mortgages, mortgagors living in an
apartment prepay more than those not living in an apartment. The relationship
between the age of the mortgagor and the SMM can take on different shapes
depending on the model. However, the coefficients are estimated imprecisely and
performing tests whether the coefficients related to Agemortgagor and its square are
zero simultaneously cannot reject this hypothesis at the 5% significance level.
The year dummies are generally significantly positive which implies that the
prepayment rates have been rising over the years, ceteris paribus.
Statistical tests favour the models including burnout. In addition, we also
compare the models by looking at the in-sample predictions for the SMM-s with the
realizations of the SMM-s. The results are presented in Figures 9 through 12. We
conclude that, despite the statistically significant difference in the parameter
estimates, the models with and without burnout are similar in terms of the
prediction of the in-sample SMM’s.21
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7. Conclusions
In the Netherlands, mortgage contracts are commonly only partially callable.
Within a calendar year, only 10 to 20 percent of the initial loan can be prepaid
without costs. Additional prepayments are settled at costs equal to the present value
of the difference between future payments of a new mortgage and the existing
contract.  The option to partially prepay the mortgage penalty free results in a loss
for the morgagee. This prepayment risk has been the topic of many studies. Most of
these models, however, focus on the American market and are based on pool
information only. In this paper, we developed a prepayment model that incorporates
the characteristics of both the Dutch market and Dutch mortgage contracts.
Moreover, the parameters are estimated by using a dataset that contains detailed
information on a loan-by-loan basis.
In this paper, a prepayment model is developed for both savings mortgages and
interest-only mortgages. The parameter estimates indicate that the likelihood that a
savings-mortgage will be prepaid increases with the age of the mortgage. Models
excluding burnout also lead to a positive relations between prepayments and the
refinance incentive. However, when burnout is included the direct effect of the
refinance incentive disappears and is taken over by burnout. The seasonality
dummies indicate that prepayments are higher in the month December, which
reflects both a holiday and a tax effect. For savings mortgages we also find lower
prepayment rates for the months January and February. People with a savings
mortgage living in an apartment also prepay more frequent than other people. This
is attributed to the upgrading effect: young people usually start in an apartment
moving to a larger house as their family situation changes and their income
increases. Similar conclusions hold for the interest-only model. However, the
magnitude of the effect on prepayment rates is different and the upgrading effect is
less prevalent.
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 Appendix A: Construction of the marginal tax rate11
The marginal tax rate is an important variable in our definition of the refinance
incentive. Unfortunately, the provided database does not contain this information on
a loan-by-loan level. But based on the general tax rules that applied to Dutch
inhabitants in the nineties, a fair estimate of marginal tax rates can be made by
applying three steps:
1.  Determine the total mortgage amount at origination. This includes all mortgage
parts, irrespective the mortgage type of the part.
2.  Divide this amount by 3.5 to obtain the gross-annual income at origination. The
factor 3.5 is a rough indication of the maximum mortgage a household can
obtain. Although this factor depends on the prevailing interest rates, we keep it
fixed for simplicity.
3.  Based on the tax regime in the origination year we determine the marginal tax
rate. We keep this fixed over time.
Steps 1 and 2 are straightforward. Step 3 requires more details on the Dutch tax
system.  First of all, the Dutch tax system involves a tax-exempt amount. Deducting
this from the gross annual income yields the taxable income. The Dutch tax system
is progressive. Taxable income up to the first threshold is taxed at approximately
38%. The remaining part of taxable income between threshold 1 and threshold 2 is
taxed against 50% and any taxable income above threshold 2 is taxed at 60%. The
tax-exempt amount depends on job and family characteristics. We assume that the
tax-free amount is equal to the amount applicable to a single person household with
a job. This amount changes over time, as do the thresholds and the tax rates. We
have data from the tax authorities as of 1992. Values for these variables 1989
through 1991 are constructed by extrapolation using the relative changes from 1992
to 1993.
The results are summarized in Figure 13. As illustrated by this figure , the vast
majority of the mortgagors in our dataset fall in the lowest tax-bracket. This holds
irrespective of the chosen redemption type.
                                                                
11 The discussion focuses on the situation from 1989 through 1999. The tax system has been
changed in January 2001. The change does not affect the tax deductibility of mortgage
interest payments but it does affect the construction of the marginal tax rate.27
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Appendix B: Mathematical Details
In this appendix we provide details on the computation of the refinance incentive for
Dutch mortgagors. The incentives are discussed for the three most common types of
mortgages, i.e. an annuity, a savings mortgage and an interest-only mortgage. To
provide the details we introduce the following notation:
t: end-of-month (just after regular payment) at which refinancing is considered
c: monthly interest rate currently paid on the mortgage
m:  prevailing monthly interest rate used to discount cash flows. This is also the
refinancing rate.
y: prevailing monthly interest rate used to compute the prepayment penalty
N: remaining number of months for which c is fixed (as of time t)
L: remaining life of the mortgage (in months as of time t)
St+i: remaining principal at time t+i, i=1,..,L
S0: initial principal
t: tax rate
a: fraction of the initial principal S0 that can be prepaid without penalty.
PMT(St,c,L): monthly payment (principal plus interest) as of month t+1
on an annuity with remaining principal St, interest c and a
remaining life of L.
PVinterest(St,c,m,L,N): present value of the interest payments on a mortgage with a
remaining principal of St, a coupon of c, a discount rate of
m, a remaining life of L and a period for which c is fixed of N
months.
PVredemption(St,c,m,L,N): present value of the redemption payments on a mortgage
with a remaining principal of St, a coupon of c, a discount
rate of m, a remaining life of L and a period for which c is
fixed of N months
For some mortgage originators, the interest rate used in the computation of the
prepayment penalty, y, is equal to the refinancing rate m. Charlier (2001) provides
more details on this. However, mortgages originated by ABP before June 1999, y is
based on the number of months equal to the current fixed-rate period rather than
the remaining number of months for which c is fixed.
In the following we assume end-of-month monthly payments and we assume that a
mortgage is refinanced with a new mortgage of the same originator. The costs
involved are 500 Dutch guilders (tax deductible). This is usually less than the costs
involved when switching to a different originator. In addition to the definitions above
we define29
fc: fixed cost when refinancing with a new mortgage of the same originator
B1. Refinance incentive for an annuity
For an annuity mortgage, monthly payments are determined from the following
relationship:
These payments include both interest and redemption. To determine St+i use that
And hence
To determine whether refinancing is profitable we need three ingredients:
1.  Prepayment penalty. This is put first because it will be financed by increasing
the principal of the mortgage after refinancing. The penalty depends on the
present value of interest payments under c compared to y for the N periods.
2.  Present value of interest payments including tax benefits plus the present value
of the principal payments both without refinancing (using c) and with
refinancing (using m and increasing the principal due to the prepayment
penalty).
3.  Difference in the time-t value of the principal remaining at t+N.
Ad 1.
The prepayment penalty is equal to Max(0,PVinterest(max(0,St-aS0),c,m,L,N)-
PVinterest(max(0,St-aS0),y,m,L,N))
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Ad 2.
PVinterest is defined in ad 1. To determine the present value of the principal payments
we first have to determine the redemptions in periods t+i, i=1,..,L
Ad 3.
The time-t value of the remaining principal at time t+N is equal to St+N(St,c,L)/(1+m)N
when not refinanced and St+N(St+(1-t)*(penalty+fc),m,L)/(1+m)N when refinanced.






B2. Refinance incentive for a savings mortgage
For a savings mortgage the gross (before tax) monthly payments are equal to the
monthly payments for an annuity (with same principal, interest rate and time to
maturity). The difference stems from two sources. Firstly, the split up of the monthly
payments is different for tax reasons. In The Netherlands, interest payments are tax
deductible whereas principal payments are not. Secondly, the principal payments
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are not deducted from the initial principal but they are placed on a savings account.
These “principal payments” are referred to as savings premia. As the principal does
not decrease, the tax authorities allow deduction of interest payments based on the
initial principal. However, for the originator the remaining balance decreases as it is
equal to the initial principal minus the value in the savings account. Therefore,
parts of the “interest payments” are added to the savings account as well (to
generate a return on this account that is equal to the interest rate on the mortgage).
In this way part of the principal payments are deductible in addition to the regular
interest payments on an annuity. For the originator the cash flow schedule is the
same as in an annuity. The savings premium is determined in such a way that, at
maturity, the savings account is equal to the principal and it is used to redeem the
mortgage.
In addition to the definitions for an annuity, define
SAt: amount of capital built up in the savings account at time t (right after the
regular monthly payment)
SP: premium that is monthly added to the savings account
Because the principal is fixed, the monthly interest payments are equal to cS0. To
determine SP, use that the discounted premia together with SAt should be equal to
the time-t value of the principal, i.e. S0(1+c)-L. Hence
Now we can determine PVinterest and PVpremia.
Ad 1.
The prepayment penalty now is equal to
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Note that this is positive if c is larger than y.
Ad 2.
Follows from the penalty and the expression for PVpremia. When refinancing, S 0
should be replaced by S0+(1-t)*(penalty+fc).
Ad 3.
To correct for differences in the savings account at t+N we need an expression for
the savings account at time t+N, given the savings account at time t and the premia
that will be paid in periods t+1,.., t+N.
Using the same argument as in Ad 1, it holds that







For an interest-only mortgage it holds that S t=S0 for all t. PVinterest equals the
expression as presented for a savings mortgage.
Ad 1.
As the interest payments are equal to the interest payments for a savings mortgage,
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Ad2.
Now only PVinterest matters. When refinancing, S 0 should be replaced by S 0+(1-
t)*(penalty+fc).
Ad 3.
Without refinancing, the remaining principal at t+N is equal to S 0/(1+m) N . When
refinancing it is equal to (S0+(1-t)*(penalty+fc)) /(1+m) N. The difference is just the
time-t value of the penalty and the fixed costs, after taxes, i.e. (1-
t)*(penalty+fc)/(1+m) N.
Adding the three together leads to the following results:
Value without refinancing:
(1-t) PVinterest(S0,c,m,N)+ S0/(1+m)N
Value with refinancing:
(1-t) PVinterest(S0+(1-t)*(penalty+fc),m,m,N)+(S0+(1-t)*(penalty+fc))/(1+m)N